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Abstract 
When children report abuse, they often report that it occurred repeatedly. In most jurisdictions, children 
will be asked to report each instance of abuse with as many details as possible. In the current meta-
analysis, we analyzed data from 31 experiments and 3099 children. When accuracy was defined as the 
number of correct details from the target instance (i.e., narrow definition), repeated-event children were 
less accurate than single-event children. However, we argue that defining accuracy as the number of 
reported details that were experienced across instances (i.e., broad definition) is more appropriate for 
repeated events. When a broad definition was applied, single- and repeated-event children were 
similarly accurate. Importantly, repeated-event children were less likely than single-event children to 
report details that had never been experienced and they were no more likely to say “I don’t know.” 
Overall, repeated-event children were more suggestible than single-event children, but this was 
moderated by length of delay to recall. In analyses of recognition data, single-event children’s 
sensitivity score was higher than repeated-event children’s, with no significant difference in response 
bias as a function of event frequency. We discuss these results in the context of how children’s memory 
for repeated events is organized. We also consider the advantage of applying a broad definition of 
accuracy for victims of repeated abuse and charging repeated abuse as a continuous offense rather than 
discrete acts. 
Keywords: children; repeated events; script memory; meta-analysis 
Public Significance. This meta-analysis suggests a legal requirement to remember details of a particular 
occurrence is more challenging for children who experienced several similar instances of an event than 
for those who experienced a single instance of an event. However, when particularization of instances 
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is not required, accuracy is comparable among children who have experienced a repeated and single 
event. 
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A Meta-Analysis of Differences in Children’s Reports of Single and Repeated Events 
Abuse is a leading reason for children’s involvement in the legal system (World Health 
Organization, 2002). Recent research on judicial decisions (Connolly, Chong, Coburn, & Lutgens, 
2015) and from child welfare organizations (Trocmé et al., 2010) in Canada demonstrated that 
approximately 50% of child sexual abuse cases involved repeated abuse. Often, there is little to no 
corroborating evidence in cases of child sexual abuse (CSA); thus, the likelihood that a case will 
proceed to prosecution will frequently depend on the specificity of the child’s report of discrete 
instances of the alleged abuse (Guadagno, Powell, & Wright, 2006). Legal requirements for discrete 
charges in most common-law jurisdictions require complainants to specify instances of abuse with 
reasonable particularity (for review, see Woiwod & Connolly, 2017). To fulfill particularization 
requirements, investigators often try to secure specific details of at least one individual instance of 
abuse, such as details related to time and place (Guadagno et al., 2006).  Accordingly, drawing on the 
findings from basic laboratory research, forensic interviewing protocols such as the National Institute 
of Child Health and Human Development [NICHD] Investigative Interview Protocol (Lamb, Orbach, 
Hershkowitz, Esplin, & Horowitz, 2007) advise forensic interviewers to direct children to describe an 
instance of alleged abuse, followed by descriptions of other instances if the child reports repeated abuse 
(see Brubacher, Powell, & Roberts, 2014). 
What is a reasonable amount of detail to expect a child who has experienced repeated abuse to 
provide about one particular instance of abuse? How might this differ from a child who has 
experienced a single episode? Despite the growing body of literature on children’s memory for 
repeated events, there is no published meta-analysis on how accurate children are when asked to recall 
an instance after a single or repeated experience and how factors such as age, delay, and the 
introduction of suggested details may moderate this effect. 
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In this meta-analysis, we synthesize the findings in the repeated-event literature to provide a 
profile of the types of details children report when asked to recount a specific instance of a repeated 
event and we describe ways in which the reports differ from children who have experienced a single 
event. We further examine how reports differ for children who have experienced a repeated event as a 
function of age, delay, and suggested details presented during a biasing interview. This is important 
because what a child can report about an instance after repeated experiences may be differentially 
affected by these factors that are frequently a consideration in forensic investigations. We also explore 
the recent suggestion that redefining accuracy for repeated event children to include all experienced 
details (rather than details from one or more specific instances) will show that repeated-event children 
are equally or more accurate than single-event children (Price, Connolly, & Gordon, 2016). 
The Typical Repeated-Event Paradigm 
Laboratory studies that have examined children’s memory for an instance of a repeated event 
have employed variations on a common experimental paradigm. In this research, children participate in 
three to six instances of a novel activity (e.g., a magic show). Across instances, children are typically 
presented with details that are fixed, variable, and/or deviations. Fixed details are experienced in the 
same way each time (e.g., children are given the same hat to wear in each instance of the magic show; 
e.g., Connolly & Lindsay, 2001). Variable details have associated options that change predictably
across instances (e.g., children are given a magic prop to use during each instance, but the type of prop 
is different in some or all shows, for instance, a wand, a ring, a kerchief; e.g., Connolly et al., 2016). 
Deviations occur when something unexpected occurs during one or more instances (e.g., a fox 
participates in one instance of the activities: Brubacher, Glisic, Roberts, & Powell, 2011 or a 
confederate interrupts one instance of the magic shows: Connolly et al., 2016). 
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After a delay, children are interviewed about discrete instance(s) of the event.  Many 
researchers use a distinct cue and label to identify the target instance that children will be asked to 
describe during the memory interview (e.g., during the target instance only, children wear a badge and 
that instance is referred to as “badge day”). The interview may consist of free recall questions (e.g., tell 
me about all the things that happened during badge day?), cued recall questions (e.g., what did you sit 
on during badge day?), and/or recognition questions (e.g., on badge day, did you sit on a mat?). 
Researchers typically code responses into the following categories: correct responses (an option that 
occurred in the target instance), external intrusion errors (a detail that did not occur in any of the 
instances and was not suggested), suggested responses (a detail that did not occur in any of the 
instances and had been suggested), and don’t know responses. Some also code internal intrusions (an 
option that occurred in a non-target instance). 
The Effects of Age and Delay on Children’s Memory for Repeated Events 
To understand the predicted effects of age and delay on children’s memory for repeated events, 
we briefly describe the two main theories that apply to memory for repeated events: script theory and 
fuzzy-trace theory (FTT). According to script theory, a script is a canonically ordered knowledge 
structure that contains the typical actors, actions, and objects in an event (Hudson & Mayhew, 2009). 
Details experienced in instances are decontextualized and linked to the script rather than being retained 
as separate memory traces for specific instances. Therefore, recall of instances is reconstructive rather 
than reproductive unless the to-be-recalled instance is recalled immediately after the experience 
(Slackman & Nelson, 1984). According to FTT, gist memory contains the general meaning for the 
event and memory for specific instances is retained in separate memory traces called verbatim memory 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). Each time a similar event is experienced, the gist trace is activated and 
strengthened and a new verbatim trace is laid (Price & Connolly, 2007). FTT asserts that it is possible 
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to retrieve memory for an entire instance if the verbatim trace has not decayed and the retrieval cues 
activate the verbatim trace (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990). 
Both theories purport that recall of instances becomes impoverished over time and more quickly 
among younger than older children. Generally speaking, the script strengthens faster for older than 
younger children and this makes it easier for older children to identify and remember differences in 
particular instances of a repeated event (Hudson, 1986; Nelson & Gruendel, 1981). Therefore, younger 
children will show a higher rate of confusion across instances (i.e., internal intrusions) than older 
children across delays-to-test. FTT notes that younger children’s verbatim traces decay faster than older 
children’s (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998; Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002; Brainerd, Reyna, Howe, & 
Kingma, 1990). Thus, older children should be better than younger children at recalling variable 
options that occurred in a target instance of a repeated event when there is a delay-to-test. 
In sum, FTT claims that retrieval of the entire instance is possible if the verbatim trace is 
identified at retrieval and has not decayed. Script theory describes recall of instances as a reconstructive 
process, which is similar to the decision-making process described by the source-monitoring 
framework (discussed below). Both theories predict that older children will outperform younger 
children in recall of details experienced during an instance because they are more sensitive to event 
changes (script theory) or because verbatim traces decay more slowly (FTT). 
Are Repeated-Event Children More Suggestible Than Single-Event Children About Variable 
Options? 
There has been debate in the literature as to whether children who experienced a repeated event 
are more, less, or equally suggestible to children who experienced a single event. Early researchers 
found that children who experienced a repeated event were more suggestible than children who 
experienced an event one time in response to recognition (yes/no) questions (Connolly & Lindsay, 
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2001) but not in response to cued recall questions (Powell, Roberts, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1999). Powell 
and Roberts (2002) directly compared children’s responses to cued recall and recognition questions and 
found that children who experienced a repeated event were more suggestible than single-event children 
in response to recognition questions and equally suggestible to single-event children in response to 
cued recall questions. 
Connolly and Price (2006) argued that a high degree of similarity between the suggested and 
experienced variable options could increase suggestibility for a repeated event. Answers to cued recall 
questions showed partial support: older children (6-and 7-year-olds) who had experienced an event four 
times were more suggestible than older children who had experienced an event one time when details 
were highly associated; however, this effect did not hold for younger children (4- and 5-year-olds). 
Roberts and Powell (2006) also found that children (6- and 7-year-olds) who experienced a repeated 
event were more suggestible than those who had experienced a single event if suggested details were 
consistent with the theme of the variable detail and less suggestible if suggested details were 
inconsistent with the theme. Taken together, these findings indicate that when suggested variable 
details are highly similar to experienced options, suggestibility is increased among both single- and 
repeated-event children, but the effect is particularly pronounced among repeated-event children. 
Memory for Experienced Details: Narrow Versus Broad Definitions of Accuracy 
In the repeated-event literature, accuracy has traditionally been narrowly defined as the number 
of options of variable details that were correctly attributed to the target instance. When accuracy is 
defined this way, repeated-event children are less accurate than single-event children (e.g., Powell & 
Roberts, 2002; Price & Connolly, 2007). Despite having impoverished instance memory, repeated-
event children have strong memory for what occurred in the event (see Hudson & Mayhew, 2009 for 
review). To fully understand the relative accuracy of single- and repeated-event children, researchers 
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must 1) examine the types of errors repeated-event children tend to make in comparison to single-event 
children (i.e., internal versus external intrusion error rates), and 2) consider how accuracy is defined. 
A broad definition of accuracy, to include all experienced details, may present a very different 
picture of comparative accuracy rates between single- and repeated-event children. It could even result 
in a reversal such that repeated-event children are more accurate than single-event children. Evidence 
for this possibility comes from Price et al. (2016) who used a broad definition of accuracy and found 
that repeated-event children were at least as consistently correct across interviews as single-event 
children. Therefore, employing a narrow definition may underestimate the extent to which repeated-
event children remember experienced details. 
We consider both narrow and broad definitions of accuracy for repeated-event children in this 
meta-analysis. A narrow definition is commonly employed because individual acts of repeated CSA are 
often charged as discrete offenses. Child complainants must describe one or more instance(s) in 
reasonable detail in order to fulfill particularization requirements for discrete charges (Guadagno et al., 
2006; Woiwod & Connolly, 2017). A charge is considered to be reasonably particularized if each 
separate act is delineated by time, place, and/or other specific details that specify the offense charged 
rather than what generally occurred in the course of the abuse (Podirsky v. The Queen, 1990; S v. The 
Queen, 1989). Some jurisdictions have recognized that memory for repeated events differs from 
memory for single events and have adopted continuous CSA legislation that reduces particularization 
requirements (Woiwod & Connolly, 2017). Although requirements differ for continuous CSA charges 
across jurisdictions, it is typically sufficient for a complainant to provide a description of what usually 
occurs along with some details that differentiate between more than one discrete act. In other words, 
under continuous abuse statutes, children are not required to describe each act with particularity. Given 
this shift in law, it is especially important that a comprehensive examination of memory for repeated 
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events include definitions reflective of requirements for charging repeated CSA as discrete offenses 
(i.e., accurate recall of each instance charged) and a continuous offense (i.e., accurate details in the 
context of the entire event). 
Present Research 
This meta-analysis fills a gap in the literature on memory for repeated events by providing a 
comprehensive examination of the ways in which children’s repeated-event reports differs from 
children’s single-event reports. Further, this compilation of existing research addresses how broadening 
the definition of accuracy for repeated-event children highlights the strengths of their memory for what 
was experienced. Our main research questions are: 
1. What are the response profiles of repeated- and single-event children when asked to
describe an instance? 
2. When accuracy is defined broadly, are repeated-event children more, less or comparably
accurate to single-event children? 
3. Are repeated-event children more suggestible to details presented in an interview than
single-event children? 
4. How do the repeated-event and single-event response profiles differ as a function of age and
delay? 
Our goal in this meta-analysis is to provide direction for forensic interviewers, investigators, and policy 
makers in order to appropriately accommodate complainants of repeated abuse. 
Method 
This meta-analysis followed the PRISMA guidelines (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic 
Reviews and Meta-Analyses: Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, Altman, The PRISMA group, 2009), which 
provide a checklist for researchers to use when conducting a systematic review and/or meta-analysis 
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and recommend authors use a flow diagram to demonstrate the four-phases of the process 
(identification, screening, eligibility, and included sources). 
Literature Search and Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the literature search and the inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Methodological approaches vary across studies of children’s memory for repeated events that have 
important implications for conclusions that can be drawn. Sometimes authors examined children’s 
memory for fixed details; sometimes they examined memory for details that changed in some but not 
all instances (e.g., hi/lo frequency details); and sometimes they examined details that varied across all 
instances (e.g., variable details). To study a narrow definition of accuracy, researchers must know the 
specific instance the child is asked to retrieve; therefore, the detail must not be the same in any two or 
more instances. To allow for a test of memory for an instance of a repeated event and analogous 
comparisons to memory for a single event (i.e., one instance of the same event), we narrowed our focus 
to studies that contained variable details of a repeated event. Deviations have been examined in 
relatively few studies (e.g., Brubacher, Glisic, et al., 2011; Connolly et al., 2016; Farrar & Goodman, 
1992) and the way that deviations have been manipulated is quite different across studies. If a study 
included variable details with options that changed in each instance as well as fixed details, data for 
both variable and fixed details were extracted. However, fixed details do not provide a test of instance 
memory and we obtained limited data for fixed details. For these reasons, fixed details were not 
analyzed and we retained only studies that included options of variable details that changed across 
instances of a repeated event in this meta-analysis. 
In the Appendix/Supplementary Materials (Appendix A and B respectively), we provide a 
complete list of: 1) excluded studies, and 2) included studies with descriptions of study characteristics 
(e.g., age of participants, number and spacing of repeated events, the target event, delay-to-test). 
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 Final Dataset 
A total of 31 experiments from 23 studies (21 published; 2 unpublished) met the inclusion 
criteria for the meta-analysis (N = 3099) and are asterisked in the References section. Experiments were 
divided into those (k = 19) containing a direct comparison between single-event (N = 925) and 
repeated-event (N = 1053) conditions and those (k = 12) containing only a repeated-event condition (N 
= 1121) and no single-event comparison condition. Publication dates ranged from 1997-2017. The 
search was concluded in 2018. 
Data Extraction 
Researchers have assessed memory for single and repeated events via free recall, cued recall, 
and recognition measures (not all experiments include each type of question). We extracted and 
analyzed a variety of response types for each of these measures, which are reported in Table 1 and 
described below. Researchers varied in whether means or proportions were reported, so we converted 
all means into proportions to facilitate comparisons across experiments. Data for all measures were 
independently extracted and coded by two authors with expertise in memory for repeated events. 
Intercoder agreement was 92.98% and all disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
The following types of details could be reported in free and cued recall: correct detail (a detail 
that occurred in the target instance), internal intrusion (a detail that was experienced by the repeated-
event group in a non-target instance), external intrusion error (a detail that was not experienced in any 
of the instances and was not suggested), suggestion (a detail that was not experienced in any of the 
instances and had been suggested sometime before the final memory interview), and don’t know (an 
expression of uncertainty). Although internal intrusions are not applicable for children in single-event 
conditions, details classified as internal intrusions in repeated-event conditions were sometimes 
reported in single-event conditions (i.e., by chance, single-event children reported details that had been 
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experienced in non-target instances by repeated-event children; some researchers included these 
guesses in external intrusion rates rather than reporting external and internal intrusions separately for 
single-event participants). In this meta-analysis, a narrow definition of accuracy consisted of correct 
details that occurred in the target instance and a broad definition of accuracy contained correct details 
that occurred in the target instance plus internal intrusions (i.e., experienced details across instances). 
Analyses for a broad definition of accuracy were only performed for studies from which we could 
compute a mean and standard deviation from the original dataset.  
The recognition data were used to compute measures derived from signal detection theory 
(Green & Swets, 1966). Respondents could respond to recognition test items in the affirmative (“yes”) 
or in the negative (“no”) for experienced details (true details) or non-experienced and suggested (false 
details) that had not been experienced during any of the instances. A hit is a “yes” response for an 
experienced detail. A false alarm is a “yes” response for a non-experienced and suggested detail. The 
hit rate and false alarm rate can be used to compute measures that distinguish between sensitivity and 
response bias (MacMillan & Creelman, 1991). Sensitivity represents the ability to discriminate between 
true and false details and can be computed using the formula d’ = z(hit rate) – z(false alarm rate). 
Response bias represents the inclination to respond in the affirmative or the negative and can be 
computed using the formula c = -0.5 × [z(hit rate) + z(false alarm rate)]. Although sensitivity and 
response bias are conventionally computed at the level of the participant, this approach is only possible 
if the hit and false alarm rates for each participant are available. We did not have access to these rates 
and researchers in the primary literature did not use this information to compute signal detection 
measures. Accordingly, we computed sensitivity and response bias using group-level hit and false 
alarm rates (see Table 1 for rate calculations across measures).  
Moderator Variables 
SINGLE AND REPEATED EVENT MEMORY META-ANALYSIS 14 
We coded two moderators: age (6.4 years and under, 6.5- to 8.4-year-olds, 8.5- to 10.0-year-
olds) and delay between the target instance and the interview (less than one week, one week or more). 
These groupings were used because they are consistent with the groupings employed in the studies 
included in this meta-analysis.  To minimize noise from differences in experimental procedures across 
studies, we only included within-study comparisons of age and delay in the moderator analyses. 
Meta-analytic Procedure 
Meta-analytic computations were performed using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis software 
(Version 2.0; Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2005). Hedge’s g was computed to measure 
the size of the difference in response types for single- and repeated-event groups. Positive g values 
indicate an increase on a response type for the single-event group, whereas negative values indicate an 
increase for the repeated-event group. Effect sizes with 95% confidence intervals (reported in square 
brackets) that do not overlap with zero indicate a significant difference. Effect sizes were derived from 
means, standard deviations, and sample sizes for all response type measures except d’ and c. For these 
two exceptions, the effect size was computed using group-level scores and p values obtained by 
estimating variance for group-level d’ and c scores (Banks, 1970; Gourevitch & Galanter, 1967). All 
analyses were weighted using the random-effects model. The Q test of homogeneity was computed as a 
significance test for variability in effect sizes. I2 was computed to measure the proportion of variability 
attributed to effect size heterogeneity, as opposed to sampling error. For all main effects, forest plots 
are reported to depict the effect size and 95% confidence intervals for each primary study. 
We tested for the presence of outliers and publication bias. An effect size with a standardized 
residual greater than 1.96 was classified an outlier (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). Whenever an outlier was 
detected, we conducted a sensitivity analysis by removing outliers with an iterative procedure and 
assessing the change in effect size as each outlier was removed (Higgins, 2008). Publication bias was 
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first assessed via visual analysis of funnel plot symmetry and then formally assessed via a trim-and-fill 
procedure. An asymmetrical funnel plot is indicative of publication bias. The trim-and-fill procedure 
specifies the number of imputed studies that would be required to make the funnel plot symmetrical 
(Duval & Tweedie, 2000). Using this procedure, we computed an adjusted effect size indicative of how 
the observed effect size would change after incorporating the imputed effect sizes. If publication bias 
and outliers were detected, effect size estimates were always adjusted from the original, unadjusted 
estimate. 
Results 
Reported statistics include the number of studies (k), the number of participants (N), the 
weighted means (rates, d’, c), the effect size (g) and 95% confidence intervals (LL, UL), the 
significance test (z, p), and the heterogeneity indices (Q, df, p, I2). For consistency, z statistics are 
always reported as absolute values. Confidence intervals in text are reported in square brackets. Forrest 
plots are reported along with the main effect analyses to display the distribution of effect sizes in the 
primary studies. The data for these analyses are available here: osf.io/avycj 
Single vs. Repeated Event Analyses 
Table 2 presents statistics from the main effect comparisons between single- and repeated-event 
conditions on free recall, cued recall, and recognition tests. Statistics for moderator effects on the 
differences between single- and repeated-events are reported in Table 3 (for the age moderator analysis, 
we only found sufficient data to compare children 6.4 years or younger and children 6.5-8.4 years old, 
described as younger vs. older). We draw attention to all significant moderator effects in text. 
Free and cued recall questions 
Correct details (defined narrowly). Correct details, defined narrowly as correct recall of a 
target instance, were more likely to be recalled by single-event than repeated-event children. In free 
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and cued recall, the mean proportion of correct details was greater for the single-event group than for 
the repeated-event group, free recall: g = 0.93 [0.58, 1.27], cued recall: g = 1.46 [1.16, 1.75]. 
Significant heterogeneity of effect sizes was detected for both test formats (Figure 2). An outlier was 
detected in the cued recall analysis (Powell et al., 2000). With this outlier removed, the effect size for 
cued recall reduced to g = 1.36 [1.11, 1.62] and another outlier was detected (Connolly & Gordon, 
2014). With the second outlier removed, the effect size for cued recall reduced to g = 1.27 [1.08, 1.45]. 
No publication bias was detected in free or cued recall of correct details. 
Internal intrusions. Participants in the repeated-event conditions were more likely than 
participants in the single-event condition to report details that were experienced during non-target 
instances (for single-event children, this is a measure of reporting details experienced in non-target 
instances by repeated-event children by chance). Repeated-event participants recalled significantly 
more details from non-target instances than single-event participants, free recall: g = -0.97 [-1.55, -
0.36], cued recall: g = -2.01 [-2.60, -1.43]. Significant heterogeneity of effect sizes was detected for 
free and cued recall of internal intrusions (Figure 3). In free recall, an asymmetrical funnel plot was 
suggestive of publication bias, leading to the imputation of one study via trim and fill analysis and a 
decrease in the adjusted effect size, adjusted g = -0.77 [-1.38, -0.16]. One outlier was detected in the 
cued recall analysis (Connolly et al., 2016, Exp. 2). With this outlier removed, the effect size for cued 
recall reduced to g = -1.73 [-2.17, -1.29]. 
Correct details (defined broadly). A further analysis was performed using the broad definition 
of accuracy that included items experienced during the target instance (correct) and items experienced 
by repeated-event children in non-target instances (internal intrusions). In free recall, the rates for 
single-event children and repeated-event children did not significantly differ, g = 0.14 [-0.07, 0.35]. 
The rates for single- and repeated-event children also did not significantly differ in cued recall, g = -
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0.33 [-0.79, 0.13]. Significant heterogeneity was detected in cued recall, but not in free recall (Figure 
4). No publication bias or outliers were detected. 
External intrusions. External intrusions were significantly more likely to be reported for single 
event conditions than for repeated-event conditions, free recall: g = 0.15 [0.02, 0.27], cued recall: g = 
0.55 [0.24, 0.87]. Significant heterogeneity was detected in cued recall, but not in free recall (Figure 5). 
No publication bias or outliers were detected. 
Don’t knows. The rates of don’t know responses for single- relative to repeated-event 
conditions did not significantly differ. The differences were nonsignificant in both free recall: g = 0.09 
[-0.98, 1.16], and cued recall: g = 0.11 [-0.17, 0.39]. Significant heterogeneity was detected in free and 
cued recall (Figure 6). In cued recall, an asymmetrical funnel plot was indicative of publication bias 
and the trim and fill procedure resulted in the addition of one study and a decrease in the adjusted effect 
size, adjusted g = 0.02 [-0.14, 0.19]. Also in cued recall, an outlier was detected (Connolly et al., 2016, 
Exp. 2). With this outlier removed, the estimate of the effect size reduced to g = -0.02 [-0.23, 0.20] and 
another outlier was detected (Powell et al., 1999). With the second outlier removed, the effect size 
estimate for cued recall increased to g = -0.09 [-0.27, 0.08]. 
Suggested details. The proportion of suggested details reported for single- and repeated-event 
conditions did not significantly differ, free recall: g = -0.20 [-0.55, 0.14], cued recall: g = -0.16 [-0.55, 
0.23]. Significant heterogeneity was detected in cued recall, but not in free recall (Figure 7). In cued 
recall, an asymmetrical funnel plot was indicative of publication bias and the trim and fill procedure 
resulted in the addition of one study and a decrease in the adjusted effect size, adjusted g = -0.08 [-0.46, 
0.30]. No outliers were detected. 
A significant moderator effect of delay was detected in cued recall of suggested details, Q(1) = 
6.97, p = .008 (Table 3). At delays of less than one week, the proportion of suggested details reported 
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was numerically greater for repeated-event children (M = 0.10) than for single-event children (M = 
0.08), g = -0.18 [-0.51, 0.15]. Conversely, at delays of one week or greater, the proportion of suggested 
details reported was significantly greater for single-event (M = 0.20) than repeated-event children (M = 
0.11), g = 0.67 [0.13, 1.21]. Given that delay was only manipulated in three studies, we recommend 
caution in interpreting this moderator effect. 
Recognition Questions 
As previously discussed, recognition questions were only asked in suggestibility studies and so 
a false alarm is a “yes” response to a question about a non-experienced detail that had been suggested. 
On recognition tests, participants in the single-event conditions consistently outperformed participants 
in the repeated-event conditions (Figure 8). The hit rate for single-event groups was significantly 
higher than the hit rate for repeated-event groups, g = 0.38 [0.04, 0.73], with significant heterogeneity 
in effect sizes. No outliers or publication bias was detected. Single-event groups were also significantly 
less likely than repeated-event groups to make a false alarm, g = -0.24 [-0.46, -0.02], with no 
significant heterogeneity detected. An asymmetrical funnel plot for the false alarm analysis indicated 
the presence of publication bias, leading to the imputation of one study via trim and fill analysis and a 
decrease in the adjusted effect size to g = -0.18 [-0.41, -0.05]. 
Computation of the signal detection measure d’ revealed significantly higher sensitivity for 
single-event groups relative to repeated-event groups, g = 0.23 [0.08, 0.39]. The higher sensitivity for 
single-event participants indicates they were better able to discriminate between correct and false 
details than were repeated-event participants. An asymmetrical funnel plot for the analysis of the 
sensitivity measure (d’) indicated the presence of publication bias, leading to the imputation of two 
studies via trim and fill analysis and a decrease in the adjusted effect size, adjusted g = 0.21 [0.07, 
0.34]. No outliers were detected in the sensitivity analysis. 
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For the response bias measure, the single- and repeated-event groups produced c scores that did 
not significantly differ, g = -0.02 [-0.20, 0.17]. The c values in both conditions were negative (see 
Table 2), indicating the respondents were biased towards reporting that an item was experienced 
regardless of whether they had taken part in a single event or a repeated event. No outliers or 
publication bias were detected in the response bias analysis. 
Repeated-Event-Only Analyses 
We examined delay effects and age differences in all studies that contained a repeated event, 
including those that did not contain a single-event comparison group. Two significant effects of delay 
were detected (Table 4). In cued recall, delays of 7 days or more led to fewer correct details, g = 0.72 
[0.52, 0.91], and more internal intrusions, g = -0.39 [-0.67, -0.12], compared with delays of less than 7 
days. Two sets of age comparisons were performed: (Set 1) 6.4 years or under vs. 6.5-8.4 years and 
(Set 2) 6.5-8.4 years vs. 8.5-10.0 years (Table 5). In Set 1, the younger children reported fewer correct 
details in both free, g = -0.55 [-0.77, -0.33], and cued recall, g = -0.55 [-0.82, -0.29], and they also 
reported fewer internal intrusions in both free, g = -0.26 [-0.50, -0.03], and cued recall, g = -0.41 [-
0.72, -0.10]. The only additional significant effect in Set 1 was for don’t know responses in cued recall, 
which were reported more frequently by younger children than older children, g = 0.67 [0.36, 1.00]. In 
Set 2, two significant effects were detected: compared with the 8.5-10-year-olds, the 6.5-8.4-year-olds 
reported fewer correct details, g = -0.27 [-0.49, -0.05], and more don’t knows, g = 0.43 [0.21, 0.65] in 
cued recall. 
Discussion 
Response Profiles of Repeated-event and Single-event Children When Asked to Describe an 
Instance 
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Our first goal in this meta-analysis was to provide a profile of responses for children who had 
experienced a repeated and single event. As described in the results section and illustrated in Figure 9, 
the typical repeated- and single-event response profiles have some different and some similar 
characteristics. Specifically, compared to single-event children, repeated-event children who are asked 
to recall a target instance provide: 1) fewer correct details in both free and cued recall, 2) a greater 
number of internal intrusions in free and cued recall, 3) fewer external intrusion errors in free and cued 
recall, and 4) a comparable number of “don’t know” responses in free and cued recall. Points 1 and 2 
are discussed in the next section. In regard to Points 3 and 4, if details are linked to memory for specific 
instances and memory for entire instances decays as predicted by FTT, one would expect repeated-
event children to respond non-substantively (i.e., “don’t know”) or with details that had not occurred at 
all (i.e., external intrusions). In fact, repeated-event children were not more likely to respond “don’t 
know” and they were less likely than single-event children to report an external intrusion. Importantly, 
there were few significant moderating effects of age, delay, and suggested details presented during a 
biasing interview in our comparisons between repeated- and single-event conditions. Although there 
was low power in the moderator analyses, the pattern of results suggests that the different reporting 
patterns for single and repeated events are similarly affected by these factors. 
Narrow versus Broad Definition of Accuracy 
Recall that a narrow definition of accuracy is often used in the repeated-event literature to 
reflect particularization requirements for discrete charges in most common-law jurisdictions which 
require children to describe each instance of abuse charged in as much detail as possible. When 
accuracy is defined narrowly, single-event children are substantially more accurate than repeated-event 
children. However, we argue that a narrow definition of accuracy understates repeated-event children’s 
ability to report what happened. Our data support this conclusion (for a related idea on requesting 
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interviewees to report details from an event at a general or coarse-grain level in comparison to a fine-
grain level, see Brewer, Vagadia, Hope, & Gabbert, 2018). Across studies that contained correct and 
internal intrusion data for both repeated- and single-event groups, the rate of correct responses was 
similar across groups when accuracy was defined broadly. This is consistent with the conclusion from 
the previous section; repeated-event children remember what happened as well as single-event 
children, but they have difficulty identifying when details happened. 
It is possible that what repeated-event children are able to remember is a kind of list of 
experienced details that are not linked to individual instances. Thus, “remembering” an instance of a 
repeated event may not be reproductive in the sense that children retrieve memory for an entire instance 
of a repeated event. Rather, “remembering” an instance of a repeated event may be largely 
reconstructive such that children report what happened and attribute details to the instance in which it 
probably happened. This is consistent with script theory. 
If the process of “remembering” an instance of a repeated event is largely reconstructive, the 
task of interviewers might be to help children to reconstruct what likely happened during particular 
instances to fulfill particularization requirements for discrete charges.  Although reconstruction of 
particular instances is likely what happens when the repeated instances of abuse were very similar and 
occurred in close temporal proximity, the rhetoric is unsettling. Imagine that a person could be charged 
criminally for something that probably happened during particular instances. Alternatively, some 
jurisdictions have adopted continuous CSA statutes to account for how children remember repeated 
events (Woiwod & Connolly, 2017). In jurisdictions that have continuous CSA statutes, 
particularization requirements are relaxed; children report what generally happens and supply some 
details from different instances without the burden of attributing details to each instance charged. This 
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meta-analysis demonstrates that the evidentiary requirements of continuous CSA statutes reflect the 
capabilities of complainants of repeated abuse. 
Suggestibility to Details Presented in a Biasing Interview 
Researchers have posited that the type of question and the thematic relation between 
experienced and suggested details account for differences in suggestibility during an interview between 
repeated- and single-event children (Connolly & Price, 2006; Roberts & Powell, 2006). Due to lack of 
data, we were unable to test the effect of thematic relationship and so this possibility remains open. 
However, we found that the type of question accounts for some of the differences in repeated- and 
single-event children’s suggestibility. There were no differences between repeated- and single-event 
children’s suggestibility in response to free and cued recall. There were differences in responses to 
recognition questions. In response to recognition questions, single-event children had a higher hit-rate 
(i.e., “yes” responses for an experienced detail) and they were less likely to make a false alarm (i.e., 
“yes” responses for a suggested detail that was not experienced) compared to repeated-event children. 
We used the hit rate and false alarm rate to compute sensitivity and response bias (MacMillan & 
Creelman, 1991) and found a higher rate of sensitivity (i.e., ability to discriminate between true and 
false details) for single-event than repeated-event children, with similar bias among single-event and 
repeated-event children. This pattern is consistent with the possibility that repeated-event children were 
more suggestible than single-event children. 
Differences in sensitivity can be explained by the source monitoring framework, which 
describes the decision-making process of attributing retrieved details to their source (e.g., Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). In the presence of suggestion, the source monitoring framework would 
predict that suggested variable details that are highly similar to experienced details enhance 
suggestibility among both single- and repeated-event children. However, this effect would be 
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particularly pronounced for repeated-event children because of the larger number of sources (i.e., 
experienced details) that are similar to the suggestions (e.g., Lindsay et al., 1991). 
Forensic interviewing protocols such as the NICHD Protocol caution against recognition 
questions (e.g., Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Horowitz, & Abbott, 2007). Our findings provide further 
reason to support this recommendation. Recognition questions are particularly problematic for 
repeated-event children, and we speculate especially so if the question contains information not already 
disclosed by the child (also see Brubacher et al., 2014). 
Repeated-event Responses as a Function of Age and Delay 
To further study the repeated-event response profile, we examined repeated-event studies that 
contained different ages and interview delays and found a predictable improvement in performance 
across ages. Consistent with the age groups used by researchers included in this meta-analysis, we 
examined three age groups (6.4 years or younger, 6.5 to 8.4 years, and 8.5 to 10.0 years). When we 
compared children’s responses who were 6.4 years or under with children who were 6.5 to 8.4 years, 
we found that older children reported more correct responses and more internal intrusions in both free 
and cued recall. Older children were also less likely to respond “don’t know” to a cued recall question. 
In analyses comparing 6.5- to 8.4-year-olds and 8.5- to 10.0-year-olds, older children reported more 
correct details and fewer “don’t know” responses in cued recall. 
It is well-known that memory declines over time. In our meta-analysis, we had sufficient data to 
compare repeated-event studies that included delays of less than one week and one week or more. We 
found that there was a higher rate of correct responses when the delay was less than one week than 
when it was one week or more. The rate of internal intrusions increased following a longer delay. 
Limitations and Future Research 
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There are two types of details utilized by repeated-event researchers that enable a test of 
instance memory: variable details with options that predictably change across instances and deviation 
details that are unpredictable changes that occur in one instance. The typical repeated-event paradigm 
contains highly predictable changes and the data we present in this meta-analysis represent what 
children recall about variable details. Therefore, our conclusions can only apply when instances in the 
series are highly similar to each other; other accurate statements may have been provided by children 
but were not reported in the included studies. This experimental reality may not be reflected in all cases 
of child abuse, and in particular, those with varied forms of abuse. In this meta-analysis, we were 
unable to include deviation details because there was too much variability in how deviations were 
defined by researchers (e.g., Brubacher, Glisic, et al., 2011; Connolly et al., 2016; Farrar & Goodman, 
1990, 1992). Based on our reading of the extant literature, we speculate that deviations that occur in 
one instance of a repeated event may enhance overall accuracy, particularly if a broad definition of 
accuracy is used. Future research on repeated events should consider instances that contain greater 
variability within the series and, in particular, with regard to details such as event structure and 
location. 
Researchers in the repeated-event literature have often designated the last instance as the target 
instance; in 15 of the 23 studies that met the inclusion criteria for this meta-analysis, the last instance 
was the target instance. Directing children to the last instance does not necessarily underestimate (or 
overestimate) children's ability to recall instances. Connolly et al. (2016) found that children 
remembered the first and last instances better than the middle instances when asked to recall all 
instances after a short delay. Research suggests that repeated-event children’s reports of the first 
instance may be more accurate than their reports of any other instance, particularly after a lengthy 
delay (Connolly et al., 2016; Hudson, 1990; Woiwod, Coburn, Bernstein, Alder, & Connolly, 2017). 
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Therefore, whether a narrow or broad definition is applied, differences in recall between repeated- and 
single-event conditions may be smaller when repeated-event children are asked about the first instance. 
Depending on a child’s metacognitive development, accurate recall of instances by repeated-
event children may increase if children are asked to report the time they remember “best”— a prompt 
that is often given in forensic interviews of children who allege repeated abuse (e.g., Brubacher, Glisic, 
et al., 2011; Brubacher et al., 2012; Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Esplin, & Horowitz, 2007). Future 
research should investigate differences in accuracy rates among children who are asked to recall the 
time they remember “best” compared to other instances. If children are asked to recall all instances of a 
repeated event, this enables a test of the time that children actually remember best. 
The instances in the studies included in this meta-analysis occurred close together: within two 
weeks (20 experiments), within one week (6 experiments), or within two days (5 experiments). In many 
cases of repeated CSA, abuse occurs over a much longer period of time (see Connolly, Chong, Coburn, 
& Lutgens, 2015; Connolly & Read, 2006).  Research on the temporal distance between instances 
suggests that encoding of individual instances is enhanced when spacing is distributed rather than 
massed (e.g., Bellezza & Young, 1998; Price et al., 2006). Future studies should seek to incorporate 
sessions that are distributed across several weeks or months.  
The repeated-event literature has increased over the past 25 years, but we did not have many 
studies for some variables in this meta-analysis and were unable to examine some important variables, 
such as the type of detail suggested during a biasing interview. Complainants of CSA are often 
interviewed multiple times and these findings do not extend to repeated interviews (see Price et al., 
2016). The repeated-event literature to date consists primarily of studies in which researchers have used 
predictable changes that occur across instances, spacing between instances which is shorter than may 
occur in repeated CSA, short delays to the interview, and a single interview. The next generation of 
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repeated-event studies would benefit from using paradigms that contain greater variability between 
instances, instances that are further spaced, interview delays that are months or years after the 
experienced event, and an interview protocol that follows current interviewing recommendations for 
complainants of repeated crimes, such as asking children to recall the time they “remember best.” The 
repeated-event literature will best inform policy recommendations in the future if researchers include 
both a narrow and broad definition of accuracy and employ paradigms that more closely resemble the 
characteristics of repeated CSA cases. 
Conclusions 
When repeated- and single-event children’s memory is compared, it is both remarkably similar 
and remarkably dissimilar, depending on the definitions adopted by researchers. When a narrow 
definition of accuracy is used, repeated-event children are much less accurate than single-event 
children. However, when accuracy is defined broadly, differences in accuracy between single-event 
and repeated-event children disappear. Interestingly, repeated-event children were less likely than 
single-event children to report a detail that had not been experienced and they were just as likely to 
provide a substantive response (i.e., no differences in “don’t know” responses). Together, these data are 
consistent with the possibility that repeated-event children remember what happened as well as single-
event children but have difficulty recalling when details happened. This suggests that “remembering” 
an instance of a repeated event is largely reconstructive rather than reproductive. A narrow definition of 
accuracy that presupposes that memory is reproductive is in line with jurisdictions that charge repeated 
CSA as discrete offenses. Some jurisdictions are more in line with a reconstructive approach to 
remembering repeated events and have adopted continuous CSA legislation that relaxes 
particularization requirements. 
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Table 1 
Response types, descriptions, and rate calculations 
Test Response Type Description Rate Calculation 
Free Recall Correct Details 
(Narrow definition) 
Report of detail from target 
instance 
𝑀 (Correct Details Reported)
Number of Details in Target Instance
Internal Intrusions Report of detail from non-
target instance 
𝑀 (Internal Intrusions Reported)
Number of Details in Target Instance
Correct + Int. I. 
(Broad definition) 
Report of detail from target 
or non-target instance 
𝑀 (Correct +  Internal Intrusions Reported)
Number of Details in Target Instance
External Intrusion 
Errors 
Report of detail from none 
of the instances and was not 
suggested 
𝑀 (External Intrusions Reported)
Number of Details in Target Instance
Suggested Details Report of nonexperienced, 
suggested detail  
𝑀 (Suggested Details Reported)
Number of Suggested Details
Cued Recall Correct Details 
(Narrow definition) 
Report of detail from target 
instance 
𝑀 (Correct Details Reported)
Number of Cued Recall Questions for Target Instance Details 
Internal Intrusions Report of detail from non-
target instance 
𝑀 (Internal Intrusions Reported)
Number of Cued Recall Questions
Correct + Int. I.  
(Broad definition) 
Report of detail from target 
or non-target instance 
𝑀 (Correct +  Internal Intrusions Reported)
Number of Cued Recall Questions for Target Instance
External Intrusion 
Errors 
Report of detail from none 
of the instances and was not 
suggested 
𝑀 (External Intrusions Reported)
Number of Cued Recall Questions
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
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Don’t Knows Report of no answer due to 
uncertainty 
𝑀 (Don′t Knows Reported)
Number of Cued Recall Questions
Suggested Details Report of nonexperienced, 
suggested detail 
𝑀 (Suggested Details Reported)
Number of Suggested Details 
Recognition Hit Recognition of detail from 
target instance 
𝑀 (Number of Target Instance Details Correctly Recognized)
Number of Recognition Questions for Target Instance Details  
False Alarm Recognition of suggested 
detail 
𝑀 (Number of Suggested Details Falsely Recognized)
Number of Recognition Questions for Suggested Details 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
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Table 2 
Main Effects for Comparisons between Single- and Repeated-Event Conditions 
Event Type Effect Size & 95% CIs Test of Null Heterogeneity 
Test Response 
Type 
 k N Sing
le 
Repeat
ed 
     g LL UL z p ≤ Q df p≤ I2 
Free Recall Correct 11 1144 .28  .13 0.93 0.58 1.27 5.24 .001 74.50 10 .001 86.6 
Int. 
Intrusion 6 459 .01  .18 -0.97 -1.55 -0.36 3.28 .001 40.11 5 .001 87.5 
Correct + 
Int. I. 6 459 .29      .27 0.14 -0.07 0.35 1.28 .202 6.12 5 .295 18.3 
Ext. 
Intrusion 8 975 .04  .03 0.15 0.02 0.27 2.23 .026 7.05 7 .424 0.6 
Suggested 
Recall 4   299 .06  .08 -0.20 -0.55 0.14 1.15 .250 6.32 3 .097 52.5 
Don’t 
Know 2 166 .03      .01 0.09 -0.98 1.16 0.16 .876 9.87 1 .002 89.9 
Cued Recall Correct 13 1051 .50  .29 1.46 1.16 1.75 9.64 .001 52.39 12 .001 77.1 
Int. 
Intrusion 7 513 .03  .27 -2.01 -2.60 -1.43 6.75 .001 42.38 6 .001 85.8 
Correct + 
Int. I. 7 513 .57      .66 -0.33 -0.79 0.13 1.42 .155 36.85 6 .001 83.7 
Ext. 
Intrusion 10 833 .13  .08 0.55 0.24 0.87 3.42 .001 43.40 9 .001 79.3 
Don’t 
Know 8   619 .17  .16 0.11 -0.17 0.39 0.75 .454 20.27 7 .005 65.5 
Suggested 
Recall 9   707 .14  .16 -0.16 -0.55 0.23 0.80 .426 50.66 8 .001 84.2 
Recognition Hit 6   619 .86  .81 0.38 0.04 0.73 2.17 .030 23.13 5 .001 78.4 
False 
Alarm 
6   619 .38     .46 -0.24 -0.46 -0.02 2.14 .032 9.58 5 .088 47.8 
Sensitivity 6   619 1.50  1.02 0.23 0.08 0.39 2.91 .004 0.58 5 .989 0.0 
Response 
Bias 
6   619 -0.42   -0.40 -0.02 -0.20 0.17 0.21 .837 6.76 5 .239 26.0 
Note. Values for Event Type are d’ scores for sensitivity, c scores for response bias, and rates for all other response types. Correct + Int. I. = Items 
from the target and non-target instances.   
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Table 3 
Moderating Effects of Age and Delay in Comparisons between Single- and Repeated-Event Conditions 
Effect Size & 95% CIs Test of Null Moderator Test 
Test Moderator Response Type Group  k      g LL UL z p≤ Q df p≤ 
Free Recall Age Correct Recall Younger 3 0.60 -0.24 1.44 1.40 .161 0.11 1 .746 
Older 3 0.44 -0.01 0.90 1.91 .055 
Ext. Intrusion Younger 2 0.04 -0.40 0.48 0.18 .861 0.21 1 .650 
Older 2 0.17 0.19 0.04 0.90 .367 
Cued Recall Age Correct Recall Younger  2 1.57 1.12 2.02 6.84 .001 0.31 1 .576 
Older 2 2.29 -0.20 4.79 1.80 .072 
Suggested Recall Younger 2 0.10 -0.73 0.95 0.25 .806 0.13 1 .719 
Older 2 -0.29 -2.24 1.67 0.29 .774 
Delay Correct Recall Shorter 3 1.87 0.72 3.02 3.19 .001 0.02 1 .896 
Longer 3 1.96 1.33 2.59 6.14 .001 
Ext. Intrusion Shorter 3 0.49 0.16 0.83 2.90 .004 0.11 1 .744 
Longer 3 0.57 0.24 0.91 3.33 .001 
Don’t Know Shorter 3 0.13 -0.44 0.71 0.45 .652 <0.01 1 .961 
Longer 3 0.12 -0.22 0.45 0.68 .496 
Suggested Recall Shorter 3 -0.18 -0.51 0.15 1.08 .279 6.96 1 .008 
Longer 3 0.67 0.13 1.21 2.43 .015 
Note. Younger = 6.4 years or younger, Older = 6.5-8.4 years; Shorter Delay = Less than 7 days; Longer Delay = 7 or more days. 
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Table 4 
Effects of Delay in Repeated-Event-Only Studies 
Test Response Type Delay Effect Size & 95% CIs Test of Null Heterogeneity 
 k N Shorter Longer      g LL UL z p≤ Q df p≤ I2 
Cued Recall Correct Recall 9 724 .42 .24 0.72 0.52 0.91 7.31 .001 11.81 8 .160 32.3 
Int. Intrusion 5 250 .27 .35 -0.39 -0.67 -0.12 2.79 .005 9.26 5 .099 46.0 
Ext. Intrusion 6 302 .08 .11 -0.05 -0.28 0.18 0.41 .681 5.41 5 .368 7.5 
Don’t Know 5 250 .12 .13 -0.04 -0.44 0.36 0.19 .847 10.23 4 .037 60.9 
Suggested Recall 5 250 .14 .19 -0.24 -0.54 0.06 1.57 .116 5.73 4 .220 30.2 
Note. Shorter = less than 7 days; Longer = 7 days or more. 
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Table 5 
Age Differences in Repeated-Event-Only Studies 
Set Test Response Type Age Effect Size & 95% CIs Test of Null Heterogeneity 
 k N Younger Older      g LL UL z p≤ Q df p≤ I2 
1 Free Recall Correct Recall 5 331 .14 .27 -0.55 -0.77 -0.33 4.84 .001 1.44 4 .837 0.0 
Int. Intrusion 5 283 .14 .19 -0.26 -0.50 -0.03 2.18 .029 2.67 3 .445 0.0 
Ext. Intrusion 2 198 .05 .03 0.29 -0.01 0.60 1.90 .058 1.18 1 .277 15.2 
Cued Recall Correct Recall 9 564 .27 .38 -0.55 -0.82 -0.29 4.11 .001 17.92 8 .022 55.4 
Int. Intrusion 3 163 .42 .51 -0.41 -0.72 -0.10 2.61 .009 0.89 2 .642 0.0 
Ext. Intrusion 3 176 .25 .16 0.20 -0.20 0.61 0.98 .327 3.78 2 .151 47.1 
Don’t Know 3 163 .22 .09 0.67 0.36 0.98 4.18 .001 0.58 2 .749 0.0 
Suggested Recall 3 172 .38 .51 -0.17 -0.85 0.52 0.48 .634 10.10 2 .006 80.2 
2 Cued Recall Correct Recall 2 333 .15 .19 -0.27 -0.49 -0.05 2.43 .015 1.04 1 .307 4.0 
Int. Intrusion 2 333 .40 .44 -0.19 -0.41 0.02 1.74 .081 0.14 1 .711 0.0 
Ext. Intrusion 2 333 .08 .09 -0.12 -0.34 0.09 1.14 .254 0.54 1 .461 0.0 
Don’t Know 2 333 .35 .26 0.43 0.21 0.65 3.86 .001 0.64 1 .425 0.0 
Note. Set 1: Younger = 6.4 years or younger, Older = 6.5-8.4 years. Set 2: Younger = 6.5-8.4 years, Older = 8.5-10.0 years. 
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Identification of sources: 
 We searched PsycINFO and Google Scholar using the following search terms: children,
repeat(ed) events, autobiographical events, event frequency, repeat(ed) event memory,
episodic memory, recall, recognition, and source monitoring.
 We searched reference sections of all articles, including review articles.
 We conducted a search using authors’ names who had published on memory for repeated
events.
 We emailed researchers in the area.
 We attempted to obtain unpublished data by contacting researchers who had published
studies or made conference presentations on memory for repeated events.
 The search concluded in March, 2018.
Records after duplicates removed: 
(N = 48 published; 4 unpublished studies) 
Inclusion criteria: 
 Studies included a repeated-event condition (three or more instances of a similar event).
 Studies tested memory for variable details with options that changed across instances.
 The event was one in which ground truth could be established.
 The article reported data sufficient to compute an effect size.
Exclusion criteria: 
 Past event; base truth was unknown (n = 3).
 Not a repeated event (less than 3 instances: n = 2;
stories were used: n = 2 published; 1 unpublished).
 Excluded studies due to insufficient data (n = 7; 1
unpublished).
 Missing variable details that changed in each instance
(n = 10).
 The data reported did not pertain to recall of an
instance (n = 3).
All studies assessed for 
eligibility: 
(N = 52)  
Studies included in 
meta-analysis: 
(N = 23; 21 published, 
2 unpublished)  
Figure 1. Flow chart for the search, inclusion, and exclusion criteria for this meta-analysis in accordance 
with PRISMA guidelines (Moher et al., 2009).
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Figure 2. Forest plot for comparison between single- and repeated-event conditions in free recall and cued recall 
of correct details (narrowly defined to include only detailed experienced during a target instance). Individual 
effect sizes are depicted as rectangles, with 95% confidence intervals depicted as horizontal lines. The average 
weighted summary effect size and 95% confidence intervals are depicted as a diamond. All effect sizes are 
Hedges’ g. Positive g values indicate an increase in correct details for the single-event group. Negative values 
indicate an increase in correct details for the repeated-event group. 
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Figure 3. Forest plot for comparison between single- and repeated-event conditions in free recall and cued recall 
of internal intrusions. Individual effect sizes are depicted as rectangles, with 95% confidence intervals depicted as 
horizontal lines. The average weighted summary effect size and 95% confidence intervals are depicted as a 
diamond. All effect sizes are Hedges’ g. Positive g values indicate an increase in internal intrusions for the 
single-event group. Negative values indicate an increase in internal intrusions for the repeated-event group. The 
horizontal line with an arrow indicates that the confidence interval exceeds Hedges’ g = -4.00.
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Figure 4. Forest plot for comparison between single- and repeated-event conditions in free recall and cued recall 
of correct details (broadly defined to include details experienced in both target and non-target instances). 
Individual effect sizes are depicted as rectangles, with 95% confidence intervals depicted as horizontal lines. The 
average weighted summary effect size and 95% confidence intervals are depicted as a diamond. All effect sizes 
are Hedges’ g. Positive g values indicate an increase in correct details, broadly defined, for the single-event 
group. Negative values indicate an increase in correct details, broadly defined, for the repeated-event group. 
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Figure 5. Forest plot for comparison between single- and repeated-event conditions for external intrusions in tests 
of free recall and cued recall. Individual effect sizes are depicted as rectangles, with 95% confidence intervals 
depicted as horizontal lines. The average weighted summary effect size and 95% confidence intervals are depicted 
as a diamond. All effect sizes are Hedges’ g. Positive g values indicate an increase in external intrusions for the 
single-event group. Negative values indicate an increase in external intrusions for the repeated-event group. 
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Figure 6. Forest plot for comparison between single- and repeated-event conditions for don’t knows in tests of free 
recall and cued recall. Individual effect sizes are depicted as rectangles, with 95% confidence intervals depicted as 
horizontal lines. The average weighted summary effect size and 95% confidence intervals are depicted as a 
diamond. All effect sizes are Hedges’ g. Positive g values indicate an increase in don’t knows for the single-event 
group. Negative values indicate an increase in don’t knows for the repeated-event group. 
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Figure 7. Forest plot for comparison between single- and repeated-event conditions for free recall and cued recall 
of suggested details. Individual effect sizes are depicted as rectangles, with 95% confidence intervals depicted as 
horizontal lines. The average weighted summary effect size and 95% confidence intervals are depicted as a 
diamond. All effect sizes are Hedges’ g. Positive g values indicate an increase in suggested details for the single-
event group. Negative values indicate an increase in suggested details for the repeated-event group. 
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Figure 8. Forest plot for comparison between single- and repeated-event conditions in hits, false alarms, sensitivity 
(d’) and response bias (c). Individual effect sizes are depicted as rectangles, with 95% confidence intervals depicted 
as horizontal lines. The average weighted summary effect size and 95% confidence intervals are depicted as a 
diamond. All effect sizes are Hedges’ g. Positive g values indicate an increase in a given response type for the single-
event group. Negative values indicate an increase in a given response type for the repeated-event group. 
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Figure 9. Profiles of repeated-event (RE) and single-event (SE) children’s responses in free and cued recall (Panels A 
and B, respectively). Data are unweighted means from experimental comparisons between RE and SE. Error bars are 
standard errors.    
